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It has been suggested that anaphoric epithets (e.g., the idiot, the bas-
tard) cannot be bound and that they are therefore a species of R-
expression (Lasnik 1976, 1989; cf. Postal 1972). At the same time, it
has been observed that epithets may not be locally bound, even in
languages in which Condition C is inoperative (Lasnik 1989). The
latter fact suggests that epithets might be pronouns and subject to
Condition B, after all. In this squib we will show that the putative
prohibition against structural binding of epithets is inaccurate and that
epithets may in fact be bound under the right discourse conditions.
We will argue that epithets are pronouns subject to Condition B and
that their anomalous distribution is due to the fact that they must be
antilogophors. That is, an epithet must not be anteceded by an individ-
ual from whose perspective the attributive content of the epithet is
evaluated.
1 Background
Jackendoff (1969, 1972) first suggested that anaphoric epithets are a
variety of pronoun, and pointed to the following examples as evidence
that an epithet may be coreferential with a nonlocal NP within the
same sentence (1972:110):
(1) I wanted Charlie to help me, but the bastard wouldn’t do it.
(2) Irving was besieged by a horde of bills and the poor guy
couldn’t pay them.
(3) Although the bum tried to hit me, I can’t really get too mad
at Harry.
Jackendoff claimed that ‘‘[t]hese ‘pronominal epithets’ can occur in
some subset of the environments in which pronominalization is possi-
ble, and they function semantically more or less as specialized pro-
nouns’’ (1972:110).
Though Jackendoff did not state what this subset of pronominal
environments is, Postal (1972:247) claimed (incorrectly, we will argue
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tion’’ between an epithet and its antecedent. As evidence for this,
Postal contrasted the above examples with (4), in which the antecedent
commands the epithet (hence structurally binds it) and ungrammati-
cality results.
(4) *Melvini claims that the bastardi was honest.
Lasnik (1976) presented similar examples of ungrammatical
bound epithets, as in (5)–(6) (1976:11, also 1989:152).
(5) *Johni/*Hei/*The sissyi realizes that the sissyi is going to
lose.
(6) *Johni thinks that I admire the idioti.
On the basis of such facts, Lasnik argued that epithets are not pronouns
at all but are, in current terms, R-expressions. That is, epithets pattern
with R-expressions in that intrasentential coreference between an R-
expression and some other NP is ungrammatical only when the latter
NP commands (binds) the R-expression. The behavior of standard R-
expressions in this regard is seen in the contrast between (7) and (8)
(1976:4, 5).
(7) a. That Oscar is unpopular was finally realized by Oscar.
b. That John is well liked proves that we ought to hire John
as public relations director.
c. That Harry won the race really surprised Harry.
(8) a. Oscar finally realized that he/*Oscar is unpopular.
b. It surprised John that he/*John is so well liked.
c. Harry was really surprised that he/*Harry lost the race.
The sentences in (7) are grammatical because the R-expressions are
not bound, whereas in (8) the same R-expressions are bound and hence
ungrammatical, in contrast to the pronouns. This all follows, of course,
from Condition C of binding theory. According to Lasnik (1976), then,
the ungrammaticality of the epithets in (4)–(6) parallels the ungram-
maticality of the R-expressions in (8), suggesting that epithets, like
names, are R-expressions (hence subject to Condition C).
While maintaining that data such as (4)–(6) demonstrate the status
of epithets as R-expressions, Lasnik (1989) took the position that epi-
thets are pronominal as well. That is, epithets are pronominal R-expres-
sions, subject to both Conditions B and C. Lasnik found support for
this position in Thai, a language that lacks pure Condition C effects
(9), though it observes Condition B (10) (1989:153, 155).
(9) C::n ch::Vp C::n.
Johni likes Johni
(10) *C::n ch::Vp khǎw.
Johni likes himi
Interestingly, Thai epithets pattern with pronouns instead of R-expres-
sions.
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(11) *C::n ch::Vp ≈âybaaV .
Johni likes the nuti
Lasnik argued that (11) follows if epithets are subject not only to
Condition C (suspended in Thai) but also to Condition B. Thus, in
Thai, Condition B effects for epithets can be isolated, whereas in lan-
guages in which Condition C obtains, Conditions B and C redundantly
conspire to make the analogue of (11) ungrammatical. Lasnik (1989)
provided further evidence that epithets are pronominals (which we
will not review here).
2 Antilogophoric Pronouns
In this section we will show that Jackendoff’s (1969, 1972) proposal
that epithets are pronominal is essentially correct. However, we will
challenge the corollary claim developed in Lasnik 1976 and 1989 that
epithets are also R-expressions. As noted above, Lasnik based this
claim on the supposition that epithets, like R-expressions in general,
may not be structurally bound (i.e., by a c-commanding antecedent).
However, the putative prohibition against binding of epithets does not
hold up under closer scrutiny.
Consider the examples in (12) and (13). In each case the anteced-
ent binds the epithet, yet the sentence is grammatical.
(12) Johni ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idioti
directions.
(13) Through an accumulation of slipups, Johni (inadvertently)
led his students to conclude that the idioti couldn’t teach.
On the basis of these facts, we claim that (4)–(6) are ungrammatical
not because of Condition C effects but because the nonlocal antecedent
in each case is the perspective-bearer (i.e., the one from whose perspec-
tive the attributive content of the epithet is evaluated). Examples (12)
and (13) are grammatical precisely because the antecedent of the epi-
thet is not the perspective-bearer. Put differently, epithets are antilogo-
phoric.1
That antilogophoricity, rather than Condition C, determines the
distribution of epithets can be seen more clearly in (14)–(17). In
(14)–(15) the antecedent does not bind the epithet, whereas in
(16)–(17) it does. In each case the epithet is ruled out only in the (a)
example, where the antecedent is the perspective-bearer.2
1 Logophoric construal of a pronoun or anaphor is often characterized in
terms of antecedence by an individual from whose perspective the proposition
containing the pronoun/anaphor is evaluated (see, e.g., Reinhart and Reuland
1991, Sells 1987a).
2 Note that each starred sentence, for which the most natural interpretation
has the antecedent as perspective-bearer, can be considered grammatical only
to the extent that one can abstract the locus of perspective away from this
antecedent and onto the discourse speaker (i.e., so that the epithetic evaluation
is the discourse speaker’s, not John’s).
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(14) a. *It was said by Johni that the idioti lost a thousand dollars
on the slots.
b. It was said of Johni that the idioti lost a thousand dollars
on the slots.
(15) a. *According to Johni, the idioti is married to a genius.
b. Speaking of Johni, the idioti is married to a genius.
(16) a. *Johni told us of a man (who was) trying to give the
idioti directions.
b. Johni ran over a man (who was) trying to give the idioti
directions.
(17) a. *Despite an accumulation of slipups, Johni asked his stu-
dents to conclude that the idioti could teach.
b. Through an accumulation of slipups, Johni (inadvert-
ently) led his students to conclude that the idioti couldn’t
teach.
Without data such as (12)–(17) it would be easy to conclude
(mistakenly) that epithets must not be bound. This is because standard
examples of bound epithets in the literature usually involve psych-
verbs and verbs of saying whose subjects typically have perspective
over the sentential complement. However, as the above data show,
epithets are not subject to Condition C, and they may be bound by
nonlocal antecedents so long as antilogophoricity is respected. This
stands in marked contrast to R-expressions.
(18) *Johni ran over a man who was trying to give the presidenti
directions.
(19) *Through an accumulation of slipups, the teacheri inadvert-
ently led his students to conclude that Johni couldn’t teach.
We note, however, that epithets can never be locally bound. Observe
(20) and (21).
(20) *Johni shaved the idioti.
(21) *Johni embarrassed the idioti.
From these facts (along with Lasnik’s Thai data), we can conclude
that epithets are pronouns subject to Condition B.3
3 One might object that examples such as the following show that epithets
may violate Condition B as well as the antilogophoricity restriction outlined
in the text:
(i) John realized that he was the real idiot.
However, we take (i) to be an example of what is often termed ‘‘accidental
coreference,’’ in which case ‘‘two NP tokens have distinct indices that are
anchored to the same referent (or, equivalently, pick out the same individual)’’
(Pollard and Sag 1994:74). This is one instance in which it is critical to distin-
guish between coindexation and coreference (see discussion in Pollard and Sag
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To conclude this section: We have shown that epithets are true
pronouns, subject to Condition B but not to Condition C. They may
indeed be bound, and they have the same distribution as pronouns
when antilogophoricity is observed. The antilogophoricity restriction
on epithets may be characterized as follows:
(22) Antilogophoricity constraint for epithets
An epithet must not be anteceded by an individual from
whose perspective the attributive content of the epithet is
evaluated.
3 Further Differences between Epithets and R-Expressions
In section 2 we showed that bound epithets have a narrower distribution
than bound pronouns and that this can be accounted for by the antilogo-
phoricity restriction on epithet antecedence. In this section we will
explore further the differences between epithets and R-expressions.
R-expressions are also subject to an antilogophoricity constraint (Sells
1987b); however, it is stronger than the one that applies to epithets,
such that the distribution of R-expressions is more constrained than
that of epithets.4 Consider first the following paradigm from Sells
1987b:
(23) a. *Hei has heard from us that Walteri will never be allowed
to enter the Lodge.
b. Hei has heard from us that under no circumstances will
Walteri be allowed to enter the Lodge.
(24) a. *We told himi that Walteri would never be elected.
b. We did our best to tell himi that Walteri would never
be re-elected.
In each case the pronoun he/him binds the R-expression Walter, and
yet the expected Condition C violation is suppressed in the (b) cases.
Sells argued that these data may be accounted for if Condition C is
subsumed under the broader antilogophoricity principle stated in (25).
(25) Sells’s antilogophoricity principle (1987b:14)
Any reference to an individual bearing a discourse role must
be syntactically expressed by a pronominal [i.e., R-expres-
sions cannot bear discourse roles].
1994). Accidental coreference is presumably involved in (ii)–(iii) as well (we
wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for example (ii)).
(ii) I am the real idiot.
(iii) I am he.
4 We wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing Sells 1987b to
our attention. Note that Sells himself draws substantially from Bolinger 1979
for his data.
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The discourse roles referenced by (25) are SOURCE, SELF, and PIVOT.
SOURCE is defined as ‘‘one who is the intentional agent of the communi-
cation’’; SELF is ‘‘one whose mental state or attitude the content of
the proposition represents’’; and PIVOT is ‘‘one with respect to whose
(space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated’’
(1987b:7).5
Applying (25) to the data in (23) and (24), we note that the (a)
sentences are ungrammatical because in each case Walter potentially
bears a discourse role but is an R-expression rather than a pronominal.
In (23a) and (24a) Walter can bear the SELF role, since the recipient
of a communication may adopt the same mental state or attitude toward
the content of that communication as held by the agent of the communi-
cation (Hamilton 1997). That is, once a message has been communi-
cated, the agent and recipient of the communication may be said to
(potentially) share awareness of the message communicated. In (23a)
and (24a) this results in a violation of (25). In (23b) and (24b), however,
the phrases under no circumstances and did our best cause the SELF
role to be restricted to the agent (not recipient) of the communication.
In (23b) under no circumstances causes the complement clause to
be treated as a quotation, emphasizing that this complement clause
represents the viewpoint of us (and not of Walter). Similarly, the phrase
did our best in (24b) emphasizes the role of the agent (we) in the
communication process, making it unclear to what extent Walter has
received the communication and adopted the same mental state/attitude
as the agent. (23b) and (24b) are both grammatical because the SELF
role is restricted in each case to the agent of communication (us/we)
instead of Walter, and principle (25) is respected.
Sells’s principle (25) accounts for grammatical sentences that
would be incorrectly ruled out by Condition C, as well as for certain
ungrammatical examples that Condition C fails to rule out. In (26)
and (27), because him/he do not bind the R-expression John, corefer-
ence cannot be subject to Condition C. (26a) and (27a) are nonetheless
ungrammatical.
(26) a. ??I answered himi as soon as Johni [PIVOT] spoke.
b. I recognized himi as soon as Johni [ ÞPIVOT] spoke.
(27) a. A: Why did hei refuse the offer?
B: ??Because Johni [PIVOT] didn’t need the money.
b. A: Why did you refuse himi the offer?
B: Because Johni [ ÞPIVOT] didn’t need the money.
In (26a) John is a nonpronominal that can bear the PIVOT role. It thereby
violates (25). In contrast, ‘‘John cannot be PIVOT in [26b] as one cannot
recognize someone whose point of view one is already taking’’ (Sells
1987b:19). Principle (25) is respected in (26b) because John can bear
5 Our account crucially relies on the contrast between the discourse roles
SELF and PIVOT. Insofar as SOURCE is not by itself essential to the points made
here, we ignore its possible significance with respect to antilogophoricity.
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no discourse roles. The same argument can be made to explain the
contrast in (27). We can conclude from this that R-expressions, being
nonpronominal, are subject to the antilogophoricity restriction stated
in (25).6
However, we will show that Sells’s constraint on nonpronominal
R-expressions is more restrictive than the antilogophoricity constraint
for epithets in (22). Whereas nonpronominals cannot bear any dis-
course role, we will find that epithets can bear PIVOT, but not SELF.
We therefore expect epithets to have a wider distribution than R-
expressions, via-à-vis antilogophoricity. Consider (28) and (29), in
which epithets replace the R-expressions in (26) and (27).
(28) a. I answered himi as soon as the idioti [PIVOT] spoke.
b. I recognized himi as soon as the idioti [ ÞPIVOT] spoke.
(29) a. A: Why did hei refuse the offer?
B: Because the idioti [PIVOT] didn’t need the money?
b. A: Why did you refuse himi the offer?
B: Because the idioti [ ÞPIVOT] didn’t need the money?
In (28) and (29) there is no discernible contrast in grammaticality
between the (a) and (b) examples, even though the idiot can bear the
PIVOT role in (28a) and (29a). If (25) is correct, then the grammaticality
of (28a) and (29a) indicates that the epithets involved are indeed pro-
nouns. That is, if (26a) and (27a) are ungrammatical because R-expres-
sions are nonpronominal and cannot bear the PIVOT role (as (25)
claims), then the grammaticality of (28a) and (29a) is evidence that
epithets are pronominal because they can bear the PIVOT role.
If (as argued above) the antilogophoricity constraint on epithets
(22) references the discourse role SELF, but not PIVOT, then we predict
that the distribution of epithets and R-expressions will overlap, when-
ever the SELF role is involved. Compare the epithets in (30) and (31)
with the R-expressions in (23) and (24).
(30) a. *Hei has heard from us that the idioti [SELF] will never
be allowed to enter the Lodge.
b. Hei has heard from us that under no circumstances will
the idioti [ ÞSELF] be allowed to enter the Lodge.
(31) a. *We told himi that the idioti [SELF] would never be
elected.
b. We did our best to tell himi that the idioti [ ÞSELF]
would never be re-elected.
In (30a) and (31a) the epithet the idiot potentially bears the SELF role,
and the sentences are as unacceptable as (23a) and (24a), which have
R-expressions instead. (30b) and (31b) are grammatical (just as (23b)
6 Sells (1987b) does not take a firm position on whether Condition C is
entirely subsumed by the antilogophoricity principle in (25) or merely overrid-
den in certain cases by this principle. We rather doubt that (25) can account
for all traditional Condition C violations, but we will not address this question
further here.
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and (24b) are) because the additional phrases under no circumstances
and did our best, respectively, serve to draw the SELF role off the idiot
and onto the agent of communication (i.e., us/we). We conclude from
the data in this section that (a) epithets are pronouns, since they may
bear internal PIVOT without violating (25), and (b) although the anti-
logophoric restriction on epithets is not sensitive to PIVOT, it is sensitive
to SELF (inasmuch as the ‘‘mental state or attitude’’ characterized by
SELF may include the evaluation of epithetic content).
4 Conclusion
It appears, then, that Jackendoff’s (1969, 1972) original claim that
anaphoric epithets are pure pronouns is closer to the mark than various
positions entertained since.7 In particular, the claim that epithets are R-
expressions (Lasnik 1976) or pronominal R-expressions (Lasnik 1989)
does not hold up under scrutiny. Epithets are subject neither to Condi-
tion C nor to Sells’s antilogophoricity restriction on R-expressions
(25). Epithets may be bound by c-commanding antecedents (in viola-
tion of Condition C) and exhibit a less restrictive antilogophoricity
constraint than do R-expressions (and hence have a wider distribution).
These facts, combined with other data indicating epithets’ pronominal
status, suggest that epithets are pronouns subject to the constraint stated
in (22), where ‘‘an individual from whose perspective the attributive
content of the epithet is evaluated’’ might be equivalent to the dis-
course role SELF.
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